Shuttle Probe Zeros In On Who Knew What And When
February 27, 1986|By Michael Tackett, Chicago Tribune.
-- Jan. 27, 1 p.m.: Boyd Brinton, Morton Thiokol Inc. director of shuttle engineering and its representative at the Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Ala., places a phone call to Morton Thiokol officials in Utah asking whether the 18-degree overnight temperature at the Kennedy Space Center caused concerns about the solid rocket motor. Brinton passes along the information about the concern about cold to Morton Thiokol engineers William Macbeth, Arnold Thompson and Charles Saderholm.
-- 2:30 p.m.: At Morton Thiokol, a meeting is held in Ebeling`s office to discuss the effects of cold weather on the solid fuel boosters` O-ring seals, which have been a problem for years and which, it is feared by some engineers, do not perform well at low temperatures. Attending the meeting are Ebeling, Macbeth, staff scientist Roger Boisjoly, Ketner, and Thompson and engineers Jerry Burn and Gregory Gorman and Russell.
http://books.google.com/books?id=-nBtoxSZAMoC&pg=PA301&lpg=PA301&dq=Bill+Macbeth+thiokol&source=bl&ots=n0G6_-F0Mq&sig=f68TI7PKMrh5bAFK_-WVLcXu5pQ&hl=en&sa=X&ei=AwwrU5jmKI2AoQTqyoGgCQ&ved=0CDMQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=Bill%20Macbeth%20thiokol&f=false
http://books.google.com/books?id=A3REsJuW2yEC&pg=PA111&lpg=PA111&dq=Bill+Macbeth+thiokol&source=bl&ots=G9MJaEIgYk&sig=mUOSrde7YbmJGnSTzeHzuREPFuk&hl=en&sa=X&ei=AwwrU5jmKI2AoQTqyoGgCQ&ved=0CDYQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=Bill%20Macbeth%20thiokol&f=false
http://graduateinstitute.ch/files/live/sites/iheid/files/sites/mia/users/Rachelle_Cloutier/public/Hashemi%20Decision%20Making%20and%20Leadership%20in%20Crisis%20Situations/Case%20-%20Challenger%20A.pdf
http://people.rit.edu/wlrgsh/Role%20Morality.pdf
As Thiokol's Bill Macbeth put it, "...when you get that kind of an impasse, that's the time management has to then make a decision. They've heard all of the evidence. There was no new evidence coming in, no new data being brought up, no new thinking, no new twists being put on it from our previous position, and we were just rehashing. And so Mr. Mason then said, "Well, it's time to make a management decision, We're just spinning our wheels."
http://www.irgc.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Boin-and-Van-Eeten-PMR-2013.pdf
Before the fateful flight of Challenger, a few Thiokol engineers suspected that the
predicted cold January weather (abnormally cold for Florida) could pose a problem to
the O-rings. They were unable, however, to provide a compelling rationale for their
intuition. In their rush to produce one on the eve of the launch, the Thiokol engineers
committed the ultimate sin of presenting aflawedrationale to the NASA engineers. The
NASA people – who had always been considered the more conservative group – were
‘appalled’ with the line of argumentation coming from Utah. The Thiokol engineers
realized their mistakes and ended up voting for launching even though their worries
remained. This is how a Thiokol engineer and a NASA engineer described what
happened (Vaughan, 1996: 302, 307):
predicted cold January weather (abnormally cold for Florida) could pose a problem to
the O-rings. They were unable, however, to provide a compelling rationale for their
intuition. In their rush to produce one on the eve of the launch, the Thiokol engineers
committed the ultimate sin of presenting aflawedrationale to the NASA engineers. The
NASA people – who had always been considered the more conservative group – were
‘appalled’ with the line of argumentation coming from Utah. The Thiokol engineers
realized their mistakes and ended up voting for launching even though their worries
remained. This is how a Thiokol engineer and a NASA engineer described what
happened (Vaughan, 1996: 302, 307):
I don’t believe they did a real convincing job of presenting their data […] The Thiokol guys even had a
chart in there that says temperature of the O-ring is not the only parameter controlling blow-by. In other
words, they’re not coming in with a real firm statement. They’re saying there’s other factors. They did
have a lot of conflicting data in there. (Marshall’s Ben Powers who agreed with the Thiokol
recommendation)
I recognized that it was not a strong technical position [to recommend against launching], but yes, I
basically supported that position. I had become very concerned during the presentation, however, when
one of the [Thiokol] people seemed to indicate […] that he had forgotten or didn’t know about one of
the recent warm temperature firings that also had a problem […] And so it began, to my way of
thinking, to really weaken our conclusions and recommendations. And I was already wishy-washy. And
that one [chart] really hit me home when I began to think, gosh, you haven’t really thought this out as
thoroughly as you should have. (Thiokol’s Bill Macbeth)
chart in there that says temperature of the O-ring is not the only parameter controlling blow-by. In other
words, they’re not coming in with a real firm statement. They’re saying there’s other factors. They did
have a lot of conflicting data in there. (Marshall’s Ben Powers who agreed with the Thiokol
recommendation)
I recognized that it was not a strong technical position [to recommend against launching], but yes, I
basically supported that position. I had become very concerned during the presentation, however, when
one of the [Thiokol] people seemed to indicate […] that he had forgotten or didn’t know about one of
the recent warm temperature firings that also had a problem […] And so it began, to my way of
thinking, to really weaken our conclusions and recommendations. And I was already wishy-washy. And
that one [chart] really hit me home when I began to think, gosh, you haven’t really thought this out as
thoroughly as you should have. (Thiokol’s Bill Macbeth)
The analysis suggests that NASA’s safety structure trumped sense-making capacities.
NASA culture had no room for arguments that violate basic engineering logic. It could
not handle ‘feelings’ or ‘doubts’ that were not supported by hard data. This was the
entrenched norm that everybody in NASA knew and abided by – this was the way it
had been done during the Apollo years.
In hindsight, it is easy to argue – as the Rogers commission did – that the doubts of
respected engineers should suffice to snuff out the problem, to experiment and test,
until safety can be proven. During the Apollo years, however, NASA had learned that
this does not work with engineers: they will tinker, test and experiment forever (for
they know that they can never prove the safety of an experimental space craft). The
system in place had served NASA well: no astronauts had been lost in space until the
Challenger explosion.
NASA culture had no room for arguments that violate basic engineering logic. It could
not handle ‘feelings’ or ‘doubts’ that were not supported by hard data. This was the
entrenched norm that everybody in NASA knew and abided by – this was the way it
had been done during the Apollo years.
In hindsight, it is easy to argue – as the Rogers commission did – that the doubts of
respected engineers should suffice to snuff out the problem, to experiment and test,
until safety can be proven. During the Apollo years, however, NASA had learned that
this does not work with engineers: they will tinker, test and experiment forever (for
they know that they can never prove the safety of an experimental space craft). The
system in place had served NASA well: no astronauts had been lost in space until the
Challenger explosion.
http://people.morrisville.edu/~galuskwj/naked_launch.pdf
Other participants, familiar with Hardy, and with the cut and thrust
of these sorts of debates, felt that there was nothing unusual about
Marshall's response. As Thiokol's Bill Macbeth said:
No, it certainly wasn't out of charactcr for George Hardy. George
Hardy and Larry Mulloy had difference in language, but basically
the same comment coming back, Ithey] were indicating to us that
they didn't agree with our technical assessment because we had
slanted it and had not been open to all the available information . . .
I felt that what they were telling us is that they had remembered
some of the other behavior and presentations that we had made and
they didn't feel that we had really considered it carefully, that we
had slanted our presentation. And I felt embarrassed and
uncomfortable by that coming from a customer. I felt that as a
technical manager I should have been smart enough to think of that,
and I hadn't.
of these sorts of debates, felt that there was nothing unusual about
Marshall's response. As Thiokol's Bill Macbeth said:
No, it certainly wasn't out of charactcr for George Hardy. George
Hardy and Larry Mulloy had difference in language, but basically
the same comment coming back, Ithey] were indicating to us that
they didn't agree with our technical assessment because we had
slanted it and had not been open to all the available information . . .
I felt that what they were telling us is that they had remembered
some of the other behavior and presentations that we had made and
they didn't feel that we had really considered it carefully, that we
had slanted our presentation. And I felt embarrassed and
uncomfortable by that coming from a customer. I felt that as a
technical manager I should have been smart enough to think of that,
and I hadn't.
http://books.google.com/books?id=-nBtoxSZAMoC&pg=PA496&lpg=PA496&dq=william+Macbeth+thiokol&source=bl&ots=n0G6_-F1Mu&sig=QRe6Cc0WEZoeX7cfzN3QFXlG-dM&hl=en&sa=X&ei=awwrU_aWO4bioAS3jYHwAw&ved=0CDMQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=william%20Macbeth%20&f=false
http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v1appa.htm
Ben Powers
John Schell
William Macbeth
Jerry E Mason
Frank Adams
Keith Coates
Brian Russell
Robert Lund
Larry Wear
George Hardy
Jack Kapp
Joseph Kilminster
James Smith
Jud Lovingood
Ron Ebeling
Roger Boisjoly
Boyd Brinton
Jack Buchanan
Calvin Wiggins
Arnold Thompson
Robert Schwinghamer
Allan McDonald
Larry Sayer
Jerry Peoples
William Reihl
Carver Kennedy
Joel Maw
James Kingsbury
Wayne Littles
Cecil Houston
Kyle Speas
John Q Miller
Lawrence Mulloy
Jerry Burn
John McCarty
Stanley Reinartz
Don Ketner
Interviews of January 27, 1986 Teleconference (8:15 PM EST) Participants
.Ben Powers
John Schell
William Macbeth
Jerry E Mason
Frank Adams
Keith Coates
Brian Russell
Robert Lund
Larry Wear
George Hardy
Jack Kapp
Joseph Kilminster
James Smith
Jud Lovingood
Ron Ebeling
Roger Boisjoly
Boyd Brinton
Jack Buchanan
Calvin Wiggins
Arnold Thompson
Robert Schwinghamer
Allan McDonald
Larry Sayer
Jerry Peoples
William Reihl
Carver Kennedy
Joel Maw
James Kingsbury
Wayne Littles
Cecil Houston
Kyle Speas
John Q Miller
Lawrence Mulloy
Jerry Burn
John McCarty
Stanley Reinartz
Don Ketner
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